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Typically, Business Angels take minority stakes; according to the study, only 5% of the BA financed
companies have majority participations of Business Angels. Slightly more than 50% received
financing at or before creation. Almost one third received support 3 years after creation - this
means that Business Angels do not only finance companies in the seed and start-up, but also in
the expansion phase.
Table 2 below shows the attributes of companies with Business Angel or/and VC support. The
authors surveyed 3,000 companies of the formation cohort 2001-2005 in the fields of high-
tech/high-quality tech and tech-oriented services. The comparison between...
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The information in this working paper does not constitute the provision of investment, legal, or tax advice.
Any views expressed reflect the current views of the author(s), which do not necessarily correspond to the
opinions of the European Investment Fund or the European Investment Bank Group. Opinions expressed
may change without notice. Opinions expressed may differ from views set out in other documents, including
other research published by the EIF. The information in this working paper is provided for informational
purposes only and without any obligation. No warranty or representation is made as to the correctness,
completeness and...
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One of the most fundamental Dodd-Frank changes
affecting private funds is the elimination of the “private
advisers” exemption from registration with the SEC as an
investment adviser (also known as the “15-client” exemp-
tion). In its place, Dodd-Frank created several new, but
less comprehensive, exemptions, with the result that most
U.S. fund managers with $150 million or more in assets
under management will need to register with the SEC,
and most fund managers that also have non-fund clients
(such as separately managed accounts) will need to reg-
ister with the SEC or a state. Those changes are discussed
in a separate article...
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Originally, several provisions under Dodd-Frank con-
cerning swaps would have taken effect on July 16, 2011,
but since such provisions required the SEC and CFTC
to implement fi nal rules, that date was not achievable.
6
The effective date of most provisions was consequently
delayed until December 31, 2011 or until new rules be-
come effective, if earlier.
7 Importantly, any provision that
references “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap dealer,”
and “major swap participant” is delayed because these
defi nitions have not yet been fi nalized.
8 Once fi nalized,
these provisions will set forth most of Dodd-Frank’s most
stringent operating requirements. ...
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Dodd-Frank provides for the comprehensive regula-
tion of swaps and requires “swap dealers” and “major
swap participants” to register with regulators.
3 As many
private funds engage in various types of swaps and
derivatives transactions, private fund managers will need
to determine if their funds are captured by these new cat-
egories, which would then require registration and com-
pliance with numerous new compliance requirements.
Since many of the rules and defi nitions have only been
proposed and not fi nalized, however, it is not possible to
make any fi nal determinations at this time....
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Additionally, Dodd-Frank imposes mandatory clear-
ing and trade execution requirements on most standard-
ized swaps.
4 Prior to the implementation of Dodd-Frank,
over-the-counter swaps were largely unregulated. The
terms of many swaps were negotiated between eligible
contract participants and not materially impacted by
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) or
SEC regulations. However, Dodd-Frank brings all swaps
under CFTC or SEC regulation.
5 This article provides a
brief overview of the new regulations....
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Excluded from the defi nition of “swap dealer” are
entities entering into swaps for their own account and
“not as part of a regular business.”16 Accordingly, it is
likely that many private funds would be excluded from
the defi nition, in the same way that private funds are
generally considered to be “traders” and not “dealers”
under Section 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act because they
buy and sell securities for their own account and not as
part of a regular business. Additionally, a person or entity
that engages in a de minimis quantity of swap dealing is
not...
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Even if an entity otherwise holds a “substantial
position” in swaps, it would not qualify as a major swap
participant if those positions are held for “hedging or
mitigating commercial risk,” among other exceptions.
20
However, the proposed defi nition of “hedging or mitigat-
ing commercial risk” would exclude swap positions held
for speculative purposes.
21 As most private funds would
presumably be deemed to be holding their swap positions
for speculative purposes, that exclusion is unlikely to
apply to them. However, depending on the fi nal defi ni-
tions of “substantial position” and “substantial counter-
party exposure,” it is likely that only very...
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Dodd-Frank requires that most swaps be cleared
through a regulated clearinghouse if the clearinghouse
accepts the swap for clearing. Under the proposed rules,
all non-exempt swaps (i.e., swaps that are not subject to
the “End User” exception discussed below) are generally
expected to be subject to clearing and exchange trading
requirements.
23 Additionally, swaps approved for clearing
must be traded on a registered exchange approved by the
applicable regulator (i.e., the CFTC or the SEC, depend-
ing on the type of swap), unless no registered exchange
accepts the swap for trading.
24
Dodd-Frank creates an exception from mandatory
clearing and exchange trading for “End-Users.”25...
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Section 619 of Dodd-Frank (the “Volcker Rule”)
generally prohibits any banking entity, including affi liates
of banks, from the following (all of which are subject to
a number of exceptions): (i) engaging in, sponsoring or
investing in a “covered fund” (e.g., a hedge fund, pri-
vate equity fund, and numerous other private funds and
pooled investment vehicles), and (ii) having certain rela-
tionships with a covered fund.
33 Additionally, the Volcker
Rule places further restrictions on banking entities and
their affi liates from serving as an investment adviser to a
private fund.
34 The Volcker Rule also prohibits banking
entities from engaging...
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The Volcker Rule prohibitions come into effect on July
21, 2012, regardless of whether the regulations are fi nal-
ized by that point.
37 Banking entities have a further pe-
riod of two years from the effective date to comply with
the Volcker Rule.
38 Additionally, regulators may, upon
application by any banking entity, extend the transition
period for the requesting banking entity (i) for up to fi ve
years (which is in addition to the two year transition pe-
riod),
39 and (ii) to the “extent necessary to fulfi ll a contrac-
tual obligation that was in effect on May 1, 2010” to...
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A banking entity may generally organize or offer a
covered fund if, among other things, it (i) owns not more
than 3% of the total ownership interests in any single
fund within one year after establishment;
46 and (ii) invests
an aggregate amount not exceeding 3% of the banking
entity’s Tier 1 capital (i.e., the bank’s regulatory capital)
in covered funds as a whole.
47 There is an exception to
the 3% rule to allow the banking entity to make a seed
investment in a fund (in which case it can own 100% of
the fund),
48 provided that within one year of...
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A banking entity may invest in or sponsor a covered
fund if (i) the banking entity is not directly or indirectly
controlled by a U.S. banking entity;
53 (ii) the banking en-
tity is a “foreign banking organization,” or, if not a foreign
banking organization, meets at least two of the following
tests: (a) total non-U.S. assets exceed total U.S. assets;
54
(b) total non-U.S. revenues exceed total U.S. revenues;
55
and (c) total non-U.S. income exceeds total U.S. income;
(iii) no ownership interests in the covered fund are of-
fered or sold to a U.S. resident,
56 and (iv) the investment
or sponsoring occurs solely outside the U.S.
...
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A banking entity may acquire or retain an owner-
ship interest in a covered fund for hedging purposes if
the acquisition or retention of the ownership interest
meets specifi ed criteria. Among other things, the hedging
activity must (i) be made in accordance with the banking
entity’s internal controls (which must comply with certain
requirements);
58 (ii) be performed by persons whose
compensation arrangements are not designed to reward
proprietary risk-taking;
59 and (iii) be made in connection
with liabilities of the banking entity that are (a) conducted
on behalf of a non-banking entity customer to facilitate
exposure by the customer to...
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Subject to a number of exceptions, fund managers
that are SEC-registered investment advisers may not
charge any type of performance fee or carried interest
to their fund investors.
72 Rule 205-3 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”),
allows registered fund managers to charge such fees
to “qualifi ed clients.”73 Rule 205-3 historically defi ned
“qualifi ed clients” as clients with at least $750,000 in as-
sets under management or a net worth of at least $150
million. Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the SEC has recently
adjusted these thresholds to $1 million and $2 million,...
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Rule 506 is a “safe harbor” for the private offering
exemption of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.
76 Pursuant
to a specifi c Dodd-Frank mandate, the SEC has proposed
a rule to disqualify issuers (which would include private
funds) from using Rule 506 for any securities offerings
involving “felons and other bad actors.”77 The “bad
boy” disqualifi cation would prohibit private funds from
relying on Rule 506 if the fund, any general partner or
managing member of the fund, the fund’s placement
agent, any 10% owner of the fund, or certain other par-
ties, have engaged in any “bad...
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Dodd-Frank includes a number of provisions requir-
ing increased reporting by private fund managers. Pursu-
ant to Dodd-Frank, the SEC, in its recent amendments to
Form ADV, added a number of items concerning detailed
disclosure of various information concerning private
funds managed by the registered adviser. In addition,
pursuant to a Dodd-Frank mandate that the SEC require
private fund advisers to fi le reports for the assessment of
systemic risk by the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
the SEC has proposed, but not fi nalized, a new Form PF,
79
which will apply to most registered private fund advis-
ers, with additional reporting required...
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Opportunity funds have delivered higher returns than core funds over the
period 2003-2009. While core fund returns have been especially
disappointing, deeper analysis suggests that the additional returns delivered
by the opportunity funds may not be adequate to compensate
investors for the significantly higher levels of risk taken by fund managers to
achieve these returns. With highly significant levels of 'beta' calculated in the
opportunity fund samples and the closeness of the observed returns to
hypothetical geared returns, the research found that opportunity fund returns
over this period have been driven primarily through pure leverage and at a
cost of huge risk to the investor....
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There is some evidence of ‘alpha’ being generated by fund managers through
'skilful transaction activity and asset management. Opportunity fund
managers also appear to have generated superior returns through controlling
the timing of the buying and selling of assets, although, with performance
fees generally charged on IRRs rather than time-weighted returns, it is open to
debate as to whom this benefits more - the investor or the fund manager.
Generally, core funds were found to have much higher levels of market risk
than expected as the sample was found to have a higher than expected beta of
1.61. The research found that core funds have failed...
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Since the mid 1990s there has been a significant growth in the aggregate
size and number of global property funds, largely fuelled by the investment
of significant capital from institutional investors. This falls into two broad
types: the 'core' universe and the 'opportunity' universe.
This growth has seen fund managers launching new funds and raising more
capital at a time when many have been unable to show clear evidence that
their funds have provided historic out-performance against market
benchmarks or performance objectives. Despite the lack of
transparency/clarity as to how well funds perform compared to their peer
group and/or the direct market, many fund management houses have...
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In a more challenging, mature, and increasingly transparent market, this is
unlikely to continue to be the case as it is increasingly possible to assembl
performance records. Investors are becoming more assertive, and
regulations/directives are playing an increasingly important role in the
need for disclosure and accountability. The question of how manager
performance is rewarded is therefore a key issue for the industry: do
performance-related fees, for example, adequately distinguish between
risk taking (higher beta) and genuine skill/out-performance (alpha)? ...
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),
1 which was signed into
law on July 21, 2010, fundamentally changes a number of
areas affecting private funds, including the regulation of
swaps, a new restriction on the ability of banking entities
to sponsor or invest in private funds (the “Volcker Rule”),
and new reporting requirements for fund managers. This
article discusses those changes, as well as more minor
changes affecting the accredited investor defi nition, the
qualifi ed client defi nition and Rule 506 disqualifi cations....
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The focus of this study is exploring determinants of mutual fund growth as its impressive
growth, Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 16.97%. As documented by Ramasamy and
Yeung (2003), growth of mutual fund industry among emerging markets is expected to grow at the rate
of double digit by 2030. There are extensive research collections of U.S. mutual fund or US funds
investing in emerging markets i.e., Sharpe (1966), Petersen (2001), Kaminsky et.al (2001), and
Ramasamy and Yeung (2003). However, research on emerging mutual funds and their determinants is
still limited. ...
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This study is distinct from pervious studies in two folds. Firstly, this study fills the gap of
limited research on emerging mutual funds. Secondly, this study explores determinants of mutual fund
growth at the asset management corporation level. Research on emerging market mutual funds are
performed at mutual fund level. Nazir et.al (2010) assessed determinants of mutual fund growth
focusing on equity funds in Pakistan. Analysis of Thai mutual fund industry and competitive situation
are elaborated in section 2. Data, model, and methodology are discussed in section 3. The last section
concludes the paper together with comments and policy...
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Four major types of mutual funds offered by Thai AMCs are fixed income, equity, mixed, and
property funds. Table 3 exhibits size (in million Baht) and proportion of each fund type offered by
asset management corporations in Thailand. Two types of fund dominate asset management industry in
Thailand namely, fixed income and equity funds. Fixed income funds outweigh other types of funds by
having the largest amount of asset under management (AUM) with drastic growth from 640 billion
Baht in 2006 to 1.23 trillion Baht in 20103
. The interpretation is that the impressive growth of Thai
mutual fund industry is...
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AUM of the equity funds increased nearly three folds from approximately 99 billion Baht in
2006 to 261 billion Baht in 2010. Unlike developed capital markets, proportion of equity funds to total
asset under management of the industry in Thailand is stable around 11% and 15% in 2006 and 2010.
Higher value of asset under management of equity funds can be decomposed into two factors, which
are valuation and new flow factors. As Thai stock market index (SET) had increased from the vicinity
of 700 points in 2006 to the level of 1,000 points in 2010, higher value in equity...
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Equity and fixed income funds play an important role for the impressive Thai mutual fund
growth. With an in depth analysis, we found two major facts. Firstly, Thai mutual fund industry is
concentrated in fixed income mutual funds especially short-term money market funds. Secondly,
approximately 50% of the AUM invested in Thai equity mutual funds are from LTF and RMF or
growth in equity mutual funds is affected by tax incentive. Further in depth analysis aiming at
indicating reasons of product concentration on fixed income funds and how tax incentive help increase
AUM of equity funds is performed by categorizing...
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As documented in both panels of Table 5, AMCs related to large Thai commercial banks (LBs)
dominate mutual fund industry. Large AMCs associated with Thai commercial banks (LBs) have
largest market share in both fixed income and equity funds. For equity mutual funds, LBs possess
38.13% market share in 2006 and their market shares grow to 52.79% in 2010. The same pattern of
high growth in market share of LB is also found for fixed income mutual funds, 58.14 to 2006 to
75.82% in 2010. Strong distribution channel of commercial bank is one of the mutual growth
determinants. As commercial...
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Large proportion in total equity AUM is asset under management of LTF and RMF-equity
funds as documented in Table 4 Panel A. LBs have largest market share in LTF and RMF-equity
throughout 2006 to 2010. LTF and RMF-equity market shares of LBs have grown from 51.25% in
2006 to 67.96% in 2010. LTF and RMF-equity gain their popularity via commercial bank distribution
channels as indicated in the last column of Table 6. Market share of all AMCs related with commercial
banks (BR) increased from 73.71% in 2006 to 87.02% in 2010. The findings lead to the conclusion that
distribution...
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To conclude this section, given full financial services of commercial banks, AMCs associated
with commercial banks (BR) dominate mutual fund industry in Thailand. Three determinants of mutual
funds growth besides funds performance are distribution channel, reputation of parent company, and
effective communication between potential investor and fund representative. Therefore, asset
management companies with better distribution channels, better access to clients through a bank's
nationwide branches, and more efficient complete financial services from their parent companies have
the advantage. Possessing the three determinants, a company can grab bigger market shares in both
fixed income and equity funds through cross selling....
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