Tài liệu miễn phí Quỹ đầu tư
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Third, we find that after accounting for luck, the percentage of funds with negative
alphas in the population is approximately equal to 20% across all categories, while the
proportion of funds with positive performance is much lower (it amounts to 1.9% of all
funds in the population). It implies that the performance of the industry as a whole is
not so bad because about 80% of the funds generate a performance sufficiently high to
cover their expenses. The negative average performance documented in past studies is
not due to the majority of funds but is caused by 20% of the funds....
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section defines the standard approach
and the notion of luck. Then, we define the F DR and explain our new methodology
which allows us to compute the F DR among the best and worst funds separately.
Section 3 presents the performance measures, the estimation technique to compute the
p-values as well as the mutual fund data. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis of
the impact of luck on performance across the four investment categories. Section 5 concludes.
An appendix gathers proofs and results of a Monte-Carlo study on the accuracy
of our new measures of luck....
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In the usual case where a single test is performed on the alpha of one fund (or one
portfolio of funds), luck is controlled by setting the significance level γ (or equivalently
the Size of the test). The standard approach differs from this framework because it boils
down to running a multiple hypothesis test instead of a single one. The null hypothesis
H0 of no performance is tested for each of the M funds in the population. In a multiple
testing framework, luck refers to the number (or the proportion) of lucky funds among
the significant funds that are discovered. Accounting for luck in this situation...
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Since
such a fund is determined according to a pre-ranking of all fund alphas, a correct inference
about its alpha must take into account the entire cross-section of the fund alphas3.
In this context, they advocate to use a bootstrap procedure, and conclude that they
account for luck in the sense that they correctly compute the p-values of the individual
funds4. This definition of luck is not related to the issue of multiple testing investigated
in this paper. In fact, we would face a similar multiple testing problem in their setting
if we wanted to know how many individual funds corresponding to the various quantiles
of the cross-section...
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Funds with differential performance are either characterized by positive or negative
alphas. To determine the source of differential performance, the standard approach partitions
the R (γ) significant funds in two groups according to the sign of their estimated
alphas. The first group contains the R+ (γ) funds with positive estimated alphas. We
refer to them as the best funds. Similarly, the second group is formed with the R− (γ)
funds with negative estimated alphas. We call them the worst funds. At a second step,
R+ (γ) and R− (γ) are used as estimators of the number of funds with positive alphas
and negative performance, respectively....
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Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) have shown that if the consumers are required to buy all the goods at one
shop (a practice usually referred to as \pure bundling) the competition can be modeled
in terms of utility oers made by retailers and thus solved relatively easily. The aim of
this study is distinctly dierent: we want to analyze pricing strategies of multiproduct
retailers when, at least some, consumers are able to buy products at dierent shops.
This phenomena seems to be widespread (e.g. savvy shoppers who buy a TV set at one
shop and a DVD player at another) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) do not address
it...
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Some authors have modeled the multiproduct price competition in dierentiated
goods where, as in our model, consumers can engage in mixing purchases between shops.
Lal and Matutes (1989) have studied price competition in a duopoly selling two independent
goods. They nd that in equilibrium retailers will charge dierent but deterministic
prices and may even capture the entire consumer surplus of the less mobile consumers.
As opposed to our model in Lal and Matutes (1989) goods are dierentiated (for some
consumers), the consumers dier in their willingness to pay and there is a economies
of scale in shopping. In contrast, we assume that the two goods are...
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In the Burdett and Judd (1983) model retailers
are selling only one good and thus setting only one price. As a result, while lowering it to
attract the shoppers they also lose sure prot they earn from the captives. In contrast, if
retailers are selling two complements, they can keep the sum of the two prices constant
at the joint reservation value of the two goods (thus ensuring that the prot earned from
the captives is unchanged) and lower one of the prices, engaging aggressively in a price
competition for the shoppers.
Joint discrimination is impossible if the two goods are substitutes. Unlike complements,
substitutes that a retailer...
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As a result, the retailer cannot keep the sum
of prices equal to their joint reservation value and start decreasing one of them to compete
for the captives as by doing so she induces the captive consumers to buy only the
cheaper good. Not only the retailers are not able to earn additional prots through
discriminating the two groups of consumers but also they will earn lower prots than
they would if all of them were selling only the bundle. When forcing consumers to buy
both goods together retailers disallow an implicit competition between the two goods
within their store. This phenomenon is unrelated to the competition...
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Even thought most
of the literature does not directly document this negative relationship there are several
attempts to prove that discounting both complementary goods at the same time could
be a protable strategy. Theoretical justication for holding sale on only one of two
complements is grounded in the monopoly paradigm: if a shop lowers a price for one
of the goods the optimal price for the other rises as the demand for it increases thus
having both goods on sale should not be optimal. It is not obvious why, in the rst
place, the monopolist has to lower one of the prices from its optimal monopoly level...
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Relatively recently, after the availability of scanned data from supermarkets some
authors started studying the choices of individual consumers in response to price discounts
rather then focusing on the overall store sales. Such approach allows to separate
the eect price reduction has on the number of items individual consumer buys from
the number of consumers price reduction attracts to the shop. Moreover, it became
possible to see which goods consumers purchase together and how this behavior changes
in response to price reductions. Van den Poel et al. (2004) have studied consumer decisions
based on their basket of purchases and found that:\[s]imultaneous large discounts
on both main and complementary...
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This nding is strongly in
line with the prediction of our model that when one of the products is on the deepest
discount the other one is priced high. Van den Poel et al. (2004) also nd that:\[t]he
situation in which a complementary product is in promotion when the main product
is not in promotion does not occur frequently. The \main product is dened as the
highest sales and prot generator. In our model we nd that If one of the goods is
valued much higher than the other (the case of \Intermediate Complements in what
follows) the interval where the price of the less valuable complement...
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We will show that in the two-good nonsequential search model prices of the two goods
will be randomized and depending on the nature of demand interrelation we expect to
nd no correlation between them if the goods are substitutes or independently valued
and negative correlation if they are complements. The latter result derives from an
inability to charge the highest price for each good simultaneously as at such pair of
prices none of the complements will be purchased at all. When deciding to carry both
substitutes the retailers are not able to charge excessive price for each of them and hence
neither of the prices is restricting...
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What follows is similar to Burdett and Judd (1983). Consider a market with N retailers
selling two homogeneous goods labeled A and B. Marginal cost of production ci (i = a; b)
is assumed to be constant, independent of a production level of the other good and equal
among the retailers. Cost of producing a bundle of one unit of each good will be denoted
by cab and is equal to ca + cb. All consumers have identical tastes and their mass per
retailer is normalized to one. The consumers demand exactly one unit of each good and
the triplet (va; vb; vab) describes their reservation...
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Since each retailer has a monopoly power through the captive consumers, the strategies
employed in the oligopolistic equilibrium depend on the pricing behavior of a hyphotetical
monopolist facing the captive consumers. Before proceeding to solving the
oligopoly model we will illustrate the optimal behavior of the consumers facing any price
pair and, subsequently, prot-maximizing strategy of the monopolist. This section will
demonstrate that the pricing by the monopolist is fundamentally dierent depending on
whether the two goods are substitutes or complements so we shall solve the oligopoly
model for these two cases separately....
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Imagine the opposite. For simplicity assume that A is the one the captives do not
buy. It should be clear that the shoppers will not buy any good that captive do not buy
so the retailer will not sell A at all. But one can always lower the price of A to such
level that it is still above the marginal cost and the captives buy both goods, a strategy
that increases prot. In terms of Figure 1 B is the only good sold if the price point is in
region B. For any point in this region the retailer can x the price of...
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When the goods are substitutes we have established that the monopolist would bundle
the goods as long as vab
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There are several way so sustain the pure components equilibrium we have solved.
Most importantly, the two goods in question can have dierent life-cycles leading to
existence of consumers who already own one of the goods and are shopping only for the
other. If number of such consumers is substantial the small gains that bundling brings
can be oset with losses from these consumers who will be less likely to buy a bundle.
Clearly we have not dealt with such consumers in our paper but we strongly believe
that such an extension will not change the main ndings of our model while eliminating
bundling as a protable...
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Furthermore, when the two goods are complements pure components equilibrium
features higher prots for all the retailers relative to the pure bundling equilibrium. If the
retail industry shares prots with the producers of these two goods in some proportional
way, none of the producers have incentive to allow bundling as that would make the
competition between retailers harsher and will lead to less prot for the industry.
Lastly, assembling goods into a bundle is a costly exercise for retailers. These costs
can outdo the small benets the bundling brings against randomizing competitors and
sustain the pure components equilibrium....
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Đẩy lùi được bất ổn kinh tế vĩ mô, kiềm chế được chỉ số giá tiêu dùng ( CPI) thấp hơn nhiều so chỉ tiêu đề ra, đồng thời lấy lại được niềm tin vào đồng nội tệ, nhưng nền kinh tế Việt Nam cũng đã phải chấp nhận sự đánh đổi. Tăng trưởng kinh tế chậm lại ở mức 5,2%, đầu tư tư nhân tăng thấp, tiêu thụ hàng hóa khó khăn, hàng tồn kho tăng cao, tình trạng doanh nghiệp khó khăn và phá sản gia tăng. Hàng tồn kho và nợ xấu ngân hàng đang như “cục...
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On MiFID and MAD, depending on when European co-legislators finalise their negotiations, 2014 may still see further drafting of Level 2 implementing measures along with national implementation. The actual application of new texts in practice, which may occur in 2014 or 2015, will then be coordinated by ESMA which may entail the drafting of guidelines to ensure supervisory convergence. It may also require further tasks such as, under MiFID II, the determination of derivatives subject to the obligation to trade on organised venues, and under MAR/MAD, the coordination of cross border investigations and of cooperation....
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ESMA’s focus in 2013 in the investment funds area will be divided between the finalisation of the key elements of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) framework, leading up to the transposition deadline of July 2013, and work in the area of UCITS. This area will also be supplemented by activity with respect to the Regulations on Venture Capital (VC) and Social Entrepreneurship Funds (SEFs).
Regarding AIFMD, ESMA intends to finalise the draft Regulatory Technical standards (technical standards) to define the types of AIFM required by Article 4(4) of the Directive by Q1 2013. These technical standards are a key...
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The EU needs to protect its citizens and their rights from threats and challenges and further
remove obstacles to circulation of citizens in Europe. This includes fighting crime and
corruption, controlling our external borders and ensuring the respect of the rule of law and of
fundamental rights, with the right balance between security and mobility. It also needs a well
functioning and efficient justice system to support growth, entrepreneurship and attract
investors. Equally, the EU works to proactively reduce risks to health, food and product
safety, critical infrastructures and disasters. Safe and sustainable use of nuclear energy is a
key element....
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European society and the European economy do not yet exploit the full potential for resource
efficiency. Much recyclable waste is either exported or sent to landfill. A lack of long-term
frameworks holds back planning and investment, most obviously on a climate and energy
framework beyond 2020, but also on long term sustainable use of key resources such as air,
soil, energy, water, fish and biomass. At the same time, such frameworks can help to
galvanise the innovation needed to exploit the potential of the transition to a low-carbon
economy in areas like transport, energy and agriculture....
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Competitiveness today must be geared to competitiveness tomorrow. There is untapped
potential for the EU economy to be more innovative, productive and competitive whilst using
fewer resources and reducing environmental damage. Less waste should be produced and
more re-used and recycled in line with the practice of the best performing Member States.
Greater resource efficiency would contribute to growth, jobs and enhanced competitiveness,
with reduced costs for business as well as significant benefits for health and the environment,
lower greenhouse gas emissions, contained energy bills and new opportunities created for
innovation and investment. The EU is particularly well-placed to give policy the long-term
dimension required....
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They say what doesn’t break you makes you stronger. For
hedge funds, 2012 was a backbreaking year to put it mildly.
Heightened market volatility, stressed global macroeconomic
conditions, and underperformance relative to traditional
investing vehicles were just a few of the factors that
challenged hedge funds in 2012. Add the extra weight of an
increasing regulatory burden, and many fund leaders might
have been forgiven for packing it in.
But something telling happened instead — the industry
emerged from 2012 stronger than it went in, surpassing the
records it set in 2007 for assets under management (AuM)
and absolute number of funds.1 Those that remained settled
into a more measured and sustainable...
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The Investment Company Institute (“ICI”) and ICI Global appreciate the opportunity to
comment on the consultative document published by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) entitled
“Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: A Policy Framework for Oversight and
Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities.”1
ICI is the national association of U.S. investment companies, including mutual funds, closedend
funds, exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”), and unit investment trusts (“UITs”) registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”).2 ICI seeks to encourage adherence to
high ethical standards, promote public understanding, and otherwise advance the interests of U.S.
registered funds, their shareholders, directors, and advisers. ICI Global is the global association...
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Obstacles to mobility remain one of the main lost opportunities of the Single Market.
Adoption and implementation of the revision of the Professional Qualifications Directive6 will
be an important step to open up professions. Work should continue to examine and reduce
unnecessary restrictions for regulated professions limiting the ability of professionals to work
in another Member State.
Preparing the new generation of programmes under the European Social Fund will be a major
goal for 2013, to ensure that this brings the quickest and most effective support to the
modernisation of labour market policies and social inclusion policies, strengthening of
education and lifelong learning systems, to ensure that groups...
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Public employment services and employers face a major challenge with the scale of
unemployment in Europe, in particular among young persons. To boost the employability
levels is key to re-launch growth, taking also into consideration vulnerable groups. The
potential for job creation in sectors such as the green economy, ICT, health and is not fully
exploited. Education and training systems are not keeping up with changing labour market
needs – resulting in shortages in key areas like science, mathematics and e-skills. Higher
education is not sufficiently connected to research and innovation activities and is slow to
build capacity in areas like ICT – which both reflects and...
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Through its capacity to combine growth and inclusiveness, our social market economy is one
of Europe's greatest assets. But today its economy and its society face the threat that the grave
problems of high unemployment, increased poverty and social exclusion risk becoming
structural. The EU dimension must be harnessed to assist Member States to find every
opportunity to help people looking for work and to address the mismatch between labour
supply and demand. This starts with an active employment policy to help them to have the
right skills to be employed and which uses the potential of mobility to the full. The goal
should be to find...
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