GIS Applications for Water, Wastewater, and Stormwater Systems - Chapter 16

CHAPTER 16 Security Planning and Vulnerability Assessment Although water and wastewater systems are generally well prepared to deal with natural disasters and accidents, many utilities prior to September 11, 2001 had given little consideration to defending themselves against acts of terrorism. Read this chapter to see how GIS can help in safeguarding your water and sewer systems against the acts of terrorism. Water distribution systems are especially vulnerable to acts of terror. Copyright © 2005 by Taylor & Francis LEARNING OBJECTIVE The learning objective of this chapter is to understand GIS applications in security planning and vulnerability assessment of water and sewer systems. MAJOR TOPICS · GIS applications in planning · Security planning · Vulnerability assessment · Security modeling software LIST OF CHAPTER ACRONYMS AMSA Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies EPA (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency ERP Emergency Response Plan OGC Open GIS Consortium VSAT Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool GIS APPLICATIONS IN PLANNING GIS technologies have enabled planning professionals to make better and faster planning decisions. New software advances have revolutionized the preparation and use of master plans for water and sewer systems. GIS technologies provide various planning tools such as: 1. Remote-sensing data (described in Chapter 3) 2. Land-use/land-cover data (described in Chapter 3, Chapter 11, and Chapter 12) 3. Intelligent maps (described in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9) 4. Hydrologic and hydraulic models (described in Chapter 11 to Chapter 13) With the help of case studies and examples, this chapter will focus on how to apply these tools for security planning purposes. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE’S WASTEWATER MASTER PLAN In 1990, the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, began a multiphase planning effort to evaluate its existing wastewater conveyance and treatment facilities, project future growth and flows, create programs for monitoring and rehabilitating existing infrastructure, and develop an organized approach to ensuring that future facilities keep pace with develop-ment. The City used GIS technology to develop a 40-year master plan for its wastewater collection and treatment system. The master plan was created by integrating the City’s GIS data with a number of other computer applications including demographic modeling, Copyright © 2005 by Taylor & Francis land-use mapping, hydraulic analysis, and infrastructure rehabilitation planning. The GIS approach enabled the City to create a master plan that could be easily updated in future as new development takes place (American City & County, 1991). SECURITY PLANNING Water, wastewater, and stormwater systems face both natural (floods, droughts, earthquakes, fires, etc.) and man-made (terrorism, vandalism, sabotage, arson, cyber attacks, etc.) threats. Although water industry utilities have learned from natural disasters, their experience with human-caused threats is small (Grigg, 2002). The basic form of protection against attacks or threats of attacks is a security system. Security planning methods include hazard assessment, vulnerability assessment, mitigation, response planning, and crisis communications (Burns et al., 2001). Vulnerability assessment is an important step in disaster preparedness. In the U.S., many utilities are performing mandatory vulnerability assessments. When terrorists attacked the World Trade Center complex in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, the U.S. witnessed one of the worst days of its 225-year history. The unfortunate event also witnessed the best of the American spirit as people everywhere, including the GIS community, rushed to help. GIS supported response efforts at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by coordinating the search for survivors and identifying hazardous areas. Planning for collection of airborne imagery over Ground Zero began within hours of the terrorist attack. Only 3 hours after the attack, France’s SPOT 4 satellite captured 20-m resolution infrared images of the fires blazing in Manhattan. On September 12, Space Imaging’s IKONOS satellite acquired 1-m imagery of both the World Trade Center area and the Pentagon (Barnes, 2001b). LIDAR* images collected on Sep-tember 19, 2001, at 5000 ft were used to create 3D depictions of the terrain and buildings of the World Trade Center complex (Logan, 2002). The media, to cover the stories related to the terrorist attack, frequently used these 3D renderings. Since September 11, 2001, concerns over intentional contamination have resulted in new federal legislation in the U.S. requiring community water systems to develop Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) (Haestad Methods, 2003a). In the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, U.S. Congress recognized the need for drinking water system utilities to undertake a more com-prehensive view of water safety and security. It amended the Safe Drinking Water Act and specified actions that community water system utilities and the U.S. Envi-ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) must take to improve the security of the nation’s drinking water infrastructure. In 2002, EPA issued $90-million grant monies to help U.S. water and wastewater utilities assess their security needs. In January 2003, the U.S. Government launched the Department of Homeland Security for coordinating the work of America’s security and intelligence agencies. Although water and wastewater systems are generally well prepared to deal with natural disasters and accidents, many utilities — prior to September 11 — had given * For additional information on LIDAR data, please refer to Chapter 3 (Remote-Sensing Applications). Copyright © 2005 by Taylor & Francis little consideration to defending themselves against acts of terrorism. Immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, many water and wastewater utilities in the U.S. quickly adopted or expanded security measures (Landers, 2002). Vulnerability of Water Systems Drinking water utilities today find themselves facing new responsibilities. Although their mission has always been to deliver a dependable and safe supply of water to their customers, the challenges inherent in achieving that mission have expanded to include security and counterterrorism. Water distribution systems are especially vulnerable to acts of terror. Water systems can be contaminated by injec-tion of poisonous substances such as cyanide. Water system operators, therefore, should be able to monitor contaminant levels and to predict contaminant movement throughout the system. These are complex tasks that require real-time monitoring and distribution-system water quality modeling. Real-time monitoring of every contaminant that could be deliberately introduced in a water system is not practical. However, a change in indicator parameters can signal the possibility of intentional contamination. The operators should be equipped with the most effective means of interpreting the monitoring data, communicating the results to decision makers and the general public, and implementing the control measures quickly (Schreppel, 2003). At the present time, most applications are focusing on the security analysis of drinking water distribution systems. Vulnerability of Sewer Systems Sewer systems can be used to contaminate receiving waters that are used for drinking-water supply intakes. Terrorists can pour volatile matter in the sewer system to create fire hazards. Large combined and storm sewers can also be used to gain access to restricted areas that have been blocked for security reasons. Although much of the attention regarding the security of water infrastructure has focused on the drinking water side, wastewater professionals have been quick to acknowledge and attempt to address their vulnerabilities. For example, the Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) of Greater Cincinnati, Ohio, turned its attention to its sewage collection system, analyzing the likelihood that its sewers — particularly some of its large combined sewers — might be used as conduits in a terrorist attack. MSD used a GIS to compare maps of its collection system with the maps of Cincinnati to conclude that there were no major targets of opportunity in close proximity to any of its large sewers (Landers, 2002). Analysis of using a sewer system to attack a wastewater treatment plant or pumping station still requires some research. GIS APPLICATIONS IN VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT Water and wastewater utilities must remain vigilant and develop comprehensive engineering and management measures to protect against future threats (Grigg, 2003). Implementing homeland security necessitates understanding the systems, Copyright © 2005 by Taylor & Francis infrastructure, organizations, and vital interactions necessary for the well-being of communities. GIS is critical to this effort because it integrates all types of information and relates that information spatially. GIS can help in the areas of risk assessment, security planning, mitigation of the effects of attacks, preparedness activities, response measures, and recovery efforts. GIS applications for community protection include modeling chemical releases in water and air, tracking and accessing information about hazardous storage sites, and managing hospital information. GIS applications can also reveal additional problems caused by proximity to hazards such as chemical storage. The modeling capabilities of GIS can simulate the effects of many types of attacks on critical resources, infrastructure, and populations. After identifying the hazards, assessing the risks, and prioritizing the values (i.e., assets of greatest value), both strategic and tactical plans can be formulated. GIS enhances response to acts of terror by helping managers to quickly assess the extent of damage and by speeding the decision-making process (ESRI, 2002d). There is no one-size-fits-all security approach that will work for all water or sewer systems. Because each utility’s situation is unique, security measures must be tailored to each system. In general, however, there are two basic requirements for the vulnerability assessment of water and sewer systems: 1. Network connectivity: This requirement pertains to what system components are connected to what and what is upstream (or downstream) of what. This capability would determine, for example, the area that would be impacted by a contaminated water storage tank. A GIS must have topology information to determine network connectivity. Network topology is inherent in many GIS packages and can easily provide this information. Network-tracing (described in Chapter 9 [Mapping Applications]) and isolation-tracing (described in Chap-ter 12 [Water Models]) functions are good examples of the network topological capabilities of GIS. 2. Contamination analysis: This requirement pertains to the strength and extent of the contaminants. GIS alone cannot provide this information. Hydraulic models capable of simulating both the quantity and the quality of water must be used in conjunction with a GIS. GIS and hydraulic modeling can be used for infrastructure protection, vulnera-bility assessment, consequence management, and security planning to safeguard water, wastewater, and stormwater systems against potential sabotage activities and terrorist attacks. Lindley and Buchberger (2002) outlined a holistic approach that combined GIS and hydraulic modeling to integrate multiple risk factors so as to identify locations that may be vulnerable to contaminant intrusions. Intrusions were defined as the introduction (either accidental or deliberate) of an undesirable agent into the potable water distribution system. An intrusion pathway was defined as the connectivity route between the potable supply and the contaminant source. EPANET* software was used for hydraulic modeling. GIS was used for layering of the locations having adverse pressure, intrusion pathway, and source concerns. * Additional information about EPANET is provided in Chapter 12 (Water Models). Copyright © 2005 by Taylor & Francis ... - tailieumienphi.vn