THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTS FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report January 2011 (information current as of November 2010) THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTS FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR by USCC Research Staff supported by Reperi LLC 1 Disclaimer: This paper is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, supported by technical analysis and market trend analysis performed by Reperi LLC. The research supporting this report has been monitored by individual members of the Commission; however, this report and its contents do not necessarily reflect the positions or opinions of either the Commission or of its individual members, or of the Commission’s other professional staff. Research for this report was performed in 2009 and 2010. A good faith effort has been made to present accurate information that would be current as of the time of publication. Any differences between current data and data in this report may be due to changes occurring during time elapsed for report preparation and review, or to the reliability of data from sources consulted. 2 NOTICE This paper presents an open source analysis of the impact on U.S. national security interests of China’s extensive engagement in the U.S. telecommunications sector. The paper’s research covers the following: • The nature of changes in the U.S. telecommunications supply chains and the impacts on U.S. national security. • The technological trends in telecommunications and related technologies. • The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) direct and indirect investment trends in telecommunications and related technologies and in the U.S. telecommunications marketplace. • The nature of the People’s Republic of China’s direct and indirect ownership, control, and influence in the U.S. telecommunications supply chain. • The penetration of the U.S. marketplace by companies subject to ownership, control, or influence by the People’s Republic of China. • The locations where products designed, engineered, or manufactured in China or supplied by companies subject to control or influence by China may appear in the U.S. marketplace and critical supply chains. • The trends in the marketplace that can be attributed to the influence of China’s ubiquitous presence in U.S. supply chains. • The nature of relationship-building between U.S. companies and companies located in and/or subject to control or influence by the People’s Republic of China. • The potential vulnerabilities of critical elements of the U.S. telecommunications market exploitable by actors in supply chain segments. • The assessment of potential cyber security impacts. • The means of assessing telecommunications and supply chain vulnerabilities. • The impacts of present and emerging vulnerabilities on U.S. defense contractors and government procurement functions. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 6 SECTION 1: MACRO-LEVEL PATTERNS OF CHINA’S TELECOM INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES 9 • Text Box: Telecommunications as a “Strategic” Industry in China 10 • Global Telecommunication Market Trends in 2008-2009 11 • CHINESE TELECOM COMPANIES ENTER THE U.S. MARKET China: Developer and Provider within China and Global Exporter of Wireless and Next Generation Networks 12 • Huawei Technologies 13 • Text Box: European Controversies over Alleged State Support to Huawei 13 • Figure 1: Huawei Technologies Offices in North America 15 • Text Box: Controversies Surrounding the Activities of Huawei 15 • Recent Unconsummated Huawei Deals, and Potential Deals on the Horizon 19 • Text Box: Concerns Regarding Potential Network Penetration by PRC Intelligence Agencies 20 • ZTE Corporation 21 • The Role of Huawei and ZTE in the U.S. Market 23 • Text Box: Examples of U.S. Market Penetration by Chinese Telecom Companies 23 • The Major Chinese Domestic Telecom Corporations 24 • Text Box: State-Directed Personnel Shuffling and Restructuring At PRC Telecom Corporations 27 • HUAWEI AND 3-COM: A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF CHINA’S FORAYS INTO THE U.S. MARKET VIA JOINT VENTURE AND ACQUISITION 28 • Text Box: A Timeline History of 3Com 29 • DEALS IN THE TELECOM SECTOR, AND THE ROLE OF CFIUS 30 • Text Box: CFIUS and the Abortive Emcore / Caofeidian Deal 31 • Figure 2: Location of Caofeidian Island 32 • Figure 3: Artist Conception of Caofeidian Island 32 • THE GROWTH STRATEGY OF CHINESE TELECOM FIRMS 33 • EXPANSION INTO DEVELOPING MARKETS 34 • THE EAST-WEST FLOW OF INVESTMENTS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 36 SECTION 2: POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES IN COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRODUCTS, AND CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN THESE SECTORS 39 • INVESTMENTS IN LONG-HAUL FIBER 39 • Text Box: The Security of Optical Fiber Networks, and the Case of Global Crossing and Hutchison-Whampoa 40 • Figure 4: Global Crossing Networks in 2010 41 • ROUTERS, SWITCHES, AND HUBS 42 • WiMAX/WiFi – NETWORK AND NETWORK CONTROL DEVICES AND PROTOCOLS FOR WIRELESS NETWORKING 44 • Text Box: Huawei and the Development of LTE Standards 45 • APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE: Software/Controllers/Drivers 46 4 • NETWORK SECURITY PRODUCTS: Security Software 46 • Text Box: The Creation of Huawei Symantec 47 • HANDSETS AND SMART PHONES 48 • Figure 5: A T-Mobile UK “Pulse” Smartphone with Huawei Android Technology 49 • HANDSETS AND SMART PHONES: POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES 49 • Text Box: The Debate Over “Open” vs. “Closed” Standards 50 • WIRELESS HEADSETS, EARPIECES, AND BLUETOOTH 54 • Bluetooth: Potential Vulnerabilities 54 • Text Box: Switching Equipment and Other Networking Services – The Nortel Story 54 • Table 1: Where China`s Products Are Found in the U.S. Communications Market 57 • Table 2: Where China`s Investments Are Found in the U.S. Communications Market 58 • Figure 6: Sample Integrated Operational Network Model (Healthy) 59 • Figure 7: Sample Integrated Operational Network Model (Corrupted) 60 • Figure 8: Sample Integrated Operational Network Model (Disabled) 61 SECTION 3: SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY, AND THE IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT/DEFENSE CONTRACTING 62 • Text Box: Supply Chain Integrity and Cyber Security 63 • Text Box: Chinese Cyber Espionage Directed vs. the United States 65 • CONTROL OF MANUFACTURING PROCESSES 65 • Text Box: Lenovo’s Entry into the U.S. Computer Market, and Controversies Surrounding its Government Sales 66 • MICROCHIP MANUFACTURING: Key Cyber Security and National Security Risks 68 • Text Box: The Defense Science Board Task Force 2005 Report on High-Performance Microchip Supply 69 • Text Box: Recent Cases Involving Counterfeited Computer Equipment from China 71 • TESTING OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 72 • Kill Switches and Backdoors 74 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 75 • SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING FOR SENSITIVE SYSTEMS 75 • RESPONSES TO SUPPLY CHAIN CHALLENGES 76 • THE CHESS GAME OF STANDARDS – THE NEW METHODS FOR OWNING SUPPLY CHAINS 77 • INNOVATION IN AMERICA, AND THE SHORTAGE OF MATHEMATICIANS, SCIENTISTS, AND ENGINEERS 78 • Table 3: Computer Science and Engineering Bachelor’s Degree Enrollments in the United States, 1980-2005 80 • PRODUCT CONTROL ISSUES IN GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 80 APPENDICES • Appendix A: What Is a Cyber Attack? 82 • Appendix B: Glossary 85 • Appendix C: Partial Bibliography 93 5 ... - tailieumienphi.vn